Articles

The​ ​73​ ​day​ ​old​ ​Doklam​ ​stand​ ​off​ ​has​ ​been​ ​peacefully​ ​resolved​ ​at​ ​the politico-diplomatic​ ​level.​ ​Before​ ​the​ ​dust​ ​settles​ ​down​ ​​ ​on​ ​the​ ​unconstructed road​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Doklam​ ​Plateau,​ ​the​ ​key​ ​question​ ​that​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​be​ ​asked​ ​is​ ​“Is the​ ​army​ ​future​ ​ready?’.​ ​​ ​it​ ​will​ ​be​ ​prudent​ ​to​ ​analyse​ ​the​ ​relevant​ ​lessons and​ ​chart​ ​out​ ​an​ ​implementable​ ​and​ ​pragmatic​ ​action​ ​plan​ ​to​ ​ensure continued​ ​peace​ ​and​ ​tranquillity​ ​along​ ​the​ ​Line​ ​of​ ​Actual​ ​Control​ ​(LAC).​ ​​ ​On account​ ​of​ ​​ ​differing​ ​perceptions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​LAC,​ ​an​ ​assertive​ ​and​ ​aggressive China​ ​and​ ​a​ ​growing​ ​new​ ​India,​ ​the​ ​peace​ ​and​ ​tranquility​ ​​ ​along​ ​the​ ​LAC will​ ​be​ ​constantly​ ​​ ​and​ ​continuously​ ​under​ ​stress,​ ​with​ ​increase​ ​in frequency,​ ​intensity​ ​and​ ​depth​ ​of​ ​transgressions,​ ​leading​ ​to​ ​more​ ​and​ ​more ‘Stand​ ​Offs’.​ ​The​ ​Doklam​ ​is​ ​likely​ ​to​ ​be​ ​the​ ​new​ ​normal.

The​ ​​ ​standoff​ ​at​ ​Doklam​ ​has​ ​once​ ​again​ ​been​ ​peacefully​ ​resolved​ ​ensuring Peace​ ​and​ ​Tranquility​ ​along​ ​the​ ​3488​ ​km​ ​long​ ​India-China​ ​Line​ ​of​ ​Actual Control​ ​(LAC).​ ​​ ​The​ ​two​ ​nations​ ​agreed​ ​to​ ​‘Status​ ​Quo’​ ​for​ ​the​ ​present, moving​ ​back​ ​to​ ​the​ ​pre​ ​16​ ​Jun​ ​2017​ ​positions.The​ ​credit​ ​for​ ​the​ ​peaceful resolution​ ​is​ ​due​ ​in​ ​equal​ ​part​ ​to​ ​India​ ​and​ ​China​ ​as​ ​also​ ​to​ ​Bhutan,​ ​at​ ​the politico-diplomatic​ ​and​ ​military​ ​levels.​ ​​ ​At​ ​ground​ ​zero​ ​it​ ​was​ ​the​ ​two​ ​armys who​ ​stood​ ​face​ ​to​ ​face,​ ​eyeball​ ​to​ ​eyeball​ ​without​ ​either​ ​blinking​ ​or​ ​raising the​ ​ante.​ ​​ ​It​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​be​ ​understood​ ​that​ ​at​ ​high​ ​altitudes​ ​and​ ​Doklam​ ​is over​ ​4000​ ​meter,​ ​the​ ​temperatures​ ​are​ ​low​ ​and​ ​tempers​ ​high​ ​and​ ​hence​ ​a major​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​credit​ ​is​ ​due​ ​to​ ​the​ ​soldiers​ ​and​ ​military​ ​leaders​ ​of​ ​Indian Army​ ​and​ ​the​ ​PLA​ ​for​ ​ensuring​ ​peace​ ​under​ ​the​ ​most​ ​difficult​ ​and challenging​ ​of​ ​circumstances​ ​which​ ​also​ ​included​ ​an​ ​exceptional​ ​case​ ​of stone​ ​throwing​ ​between​ ​the​ ​patrol​ ​parties​ ​North​ ​of​ ​Pangong​ ​Tso​ ​in​ ​Eastern Ladakh.

The​ ​3488​ ​km​ ​long​ ​India​ ​China​ ​border​ ​is​ ​a​ ​set​ ​of​ ​contradictions.​ ​​ ​It​ ​is the​ ​longest​ ​disputed​ ​peaceful​ ​border​ ​in​ ​the​ ​world,​ ​​ ​with​ ​the​ ​last​ ​shot​ ​in anger​ ​fired​ ​in​ ​Oct​ ​1975.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​no​ ​common​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​the​ ​LAC​ ​and China​ ​lays​ ​claims​ ​to​ ​a​ ​little​ ​over​ ​1,10,000​ ​sq​ ​kms​ ​of​ ​Indian​ ​territory,​ ​some of​ ​which​ ​is​ ​occupied​ ​by​ ​China.​ ​​ ​Doklam​ ​was​ ​neither​ ​the​ ​first​ ​nor​ ​the​ ​last ‘stand​ ​off’​ ​between​ ​the​ ​two​ ​nuclear​ ​armed​ ​Asian​ ​giants,​ ​home​ ​to​ ​one​ ​third of​ ​humanity.​ ​​ ​It​ ​is​ ​an​ ​imperative​ ​that​ ​structural​ ​and​ ​organisational​ ​infirmities are​ ​corrected​ ​and​ ​systematic​ ​​ ​changes​ ​initiated​ ​to​ ​further​ ​peace​ ​tranquility and​ ​equilibrium​ ​along​ ​the​ ​India​ ​-​ ​China​ ​border.​ ​​ ​The​ ​disputed​ ​border​ ​is​ ​a potential​ ​driver​ ​for​ ​conflict.​ ​​ ​China​ ​respects​ ​strength​ ​and​ ​India​ ​will​ ​need​ ​to enhance​ ​capacities​ ​and​ ​build​ ​capabilities​ ​to​ ​be​ ​future​ ​ready.​ ​​ ​Key​ ​issues need​ ​to​ ​be​ ​addressed​ ​immediately​ ​and​ ​urgently​ ​post​ ​Doklam.

The​ ​vast​ ​and​ ​varied​ ​Northern​ ​borders​ ​with​ ​China​ ​are​ ​manned​ ​and managed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​​ ​Army​ ​and​ ​ITBP​ ​often​ ​leading​ ​to​ ​competition​ ​and​ ​conflict with​ ​coordination​ ​and​ ​cooperation​ ​between​ ​individual​ ​commanders​ ​based on​ ​personalities.​ ​​ ​​ ​There​ ​are​ ​also​ ​two​ ​channels​ ​of​ ​reporting​ ​and​ ​​ ​issues​ ​of accountability,​ ​as​ ​​ ​the​ ​ITBP​ ​is​ ​under​ ​the​ ​Ministry​ ​of​ ​Home​ ​Affairs.​ ​​ ​This dual​ ​command​ ​and​ ​control​ ​structure​ ​is​ ​a​ ​recipe​ ​for​ ​disaster​ ​as​ ​​ ​conflicting directions​ ​and​ ​guidelines​ ​can​ ​emanate​ ​from​ ​the​ ​two​ ​controlling​ ​ministries i.e.​ ​MHA​ ​and​ ​MoD​ ​​ ​and​ ​more​ ​often​ ​than​ ​not​ ​by​ ​intermediary​ ​headquarters. There​ ​is​ ​an​ ​urgent​ ​dictate​ ​​ ​to​ ​resolve​ ​the​ ​flawed​ ​command​ ​and​ ​control structure​ ​as​ ​recommended​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Group​ ​of​ ​Ministers(GOM)​ ​report​ ​on “Reforming​ ​National​ ​Security”​ ​post​ ​Kargil​ ​in​ ​2001​ ​.​ ​​​ ​​The​ ​major​ ​problem identified​ ​by​ ​the​ ​GOM​ ​vide​ ​para​ ​5.12​ ​was​ ​"​ ​At​ ​present​ ​there​ ​are​ ​instances of​ ​more​ ​than​ ​one​ ​force​ ​working​ ​on​ ​the​ ​same​ ​border​ ​and​ ​questions​ ​of conflict​ ​in​ ​command​ ​and​ ​control​ ​have​ ​been​ ​raised​ ​frequently.​ ​Multiplicity​ ​of forces​ ​on​ ​the​ ​same​ ​border​ ​has​ ​also​ ​led​ ​to​ ​lack​ ​of​ ​accountability​ ​on​ ​the​ ​part of​ ​the​ ​forces.​ ​To​ ​enforce​ ​the​ ​accountability,​ ​the​ ​principle​ ​of​ ​‘one​ ​border​ ​one force’​ ​may​ ​be​ ​adopted​ ​while​ ​considering​ ​deployment​ ​of​ ​forces​ ​at​ ​the border."​ ​​ ​The​ ​recommendations​ ​of​ ​the​ ​GOM​ ​have​ ​been​ ​been​ ​implemented along​ ​all​ ​borders​ ​with​ ​neighbouring​ ​countries​ ​except​ ​the​ ​most​ ​sensitive​ ​and important​ ​border​ ​with​ ​China.​ ​​ ​The​ ​ITBP​ ​should​ ​to​ ​be​ ​placed​ ​under command​ ​and​ ​control​ ​​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Army,​ ​in​ ​keeping​ ​with​ ​the​ ​successful​ ​model along​ ​the​ ​LC​ ​where​ ​the​ ​BSF​ ​operates​ ​under​ ​the​ ​operational​ ​control​ ​of​ ​the army.

The​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​border​ ​guarding​ ​and​ ​border​ ​defence​ ​between​ ​India and​ ​China​ ​are​ ​at​ ​two​ ​extremes.​ ​​ ​India​ ​has​ ​always​ ​believed​ ​in​ ​​ ​ab​ ​initio deployment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Army​ ​along​ ​the​ ​LAC​ ​in​ ​all​ ​sensitive​ ​and​ ​disputed pockets,​ ​incurring​ ​avoidable​ ​resource​ ​costs.​ ​​ ​China​ ​on​ ​the​ ​other​ ​hand​ ​has successfully​ ​evolved​ ​​ ​the​ ​concept​ ​of​ ​‘Three​ ​Rs’​ ​​ ​-​ ​Roads,​ ​Radars​ ​and Reserves.​ ​This​ ​gives​ ​the​ ​PLA​ ​​ ​battlefield​ ​and​ ​tactical​ ​mobility​ ​to​ ​dominate the​ ​LAC​ ​and​ ​patrol​ ​the​ ​borders​ ​effectively.​ ​China​ ​has​ ​not​ ​only​ ​developed​ ​a multi​ ​dimensional,​ ​multi​ ​modal​ ​state​ ​of​ ​the​ ​art​ ​infrastructure​ ​in​ ​Tibet,​ ​but also​ ​​ ​has​ ​a​ ​vast​ ​network​ ​of​ ​roads​ ​and​ ​tracks​ ​all​ ​along​ ​the​ ​border connecting​ ​most​ ​passes​ ​on​ ​the​ ​watershed.​ ​​ ​The​ ​attempt​ ​to​ ​change​ ​the ‘Status​ ​Quo’​ ​in​ ​Doklam​ ​was​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​PLA​ ​modus​ ​operandi​ ​and​ ​tactics​ ​to connect​ ​all​ ​passes​ ​including​ ​Chelela​ ​Pass​ ​on​ ​the​ ​Jampheri​ ​Ridge​ ​,​ ​which of​ ​course​ ​is​ ​a​ ​core​ ​security​ ​concern​ ​for​ ​India​ ​as​ ​it​ ​directly​ ​threatens​ ​the​ ​NH 3I​ ​C​ ​,​ ​the​ ​link​ ​through​ ​the​ ​Siliguri​ ​Corridor​ ​connecting​ ​eight​ ​and​ ​half​ ​states and​ ​five​ ​crore​ ​people.​ ​​ ​India​ ​too​ ​can​ ​replicate​ ​this​ ​model​ ​and​ ​chart​ ​out​ ​a focussed​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​Infrastructure​ ​Development.​ ​​ ​India​ ​shied​ ​away​ ​from constructing​ ​border​ ​roads​ ​till​ ​2005.​ ​In​ ​a​ ​shift​ ​from​ ​policy​ ​the​ ​government sanctioned​ ​73​ ​India​ ​China​ ​border​ ​roads​ ​to​ ​be​ ​completed​ ​by​ ​2012.​ ​​ ​Forty​ ​six of​ ​these​ ​73​ ​roads​ ​are​ ​still​ ​in​ ​various​ ​stages​ ​of​ ​completion​ ​​ ​and​ ​contract. The​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​Infrastructure​ ​Development​ ​needs​ ​a​ ​multi​ ​pronged​ ​focussed approach​ ​to​ ​address​ ​the​ ​security​ ​concerns​ ​and​ ​development​ ​of​ ​the​ ​border areas.​ ​​ ​This​ ​​ ​will​ ​also​ ​​ ​contribute​ ​to​ ​the​ ​integration​ ​and​ ​development​ ​of​ ​our border​ ​areas​ ​and​ ​people,​ ​facilitating​ ​better​ ​education,​ ​health​ ​care​ ​and economic​ ​activities​ ​including​ ​tourism.​ ​​ ​The​ ​government​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​be decisive​ ​and​ ​act​ ​fast.​ ​​ ​As​ ​the​ ​first​ ​step​ ​​ ​the​ ​Land​ ​Acquisition,​ ​Rehabilitation and​ ​Resettlement​ ​Act,​ ​2013​ ​(LARR)​ ​should​ ​be​ ​amended​ ​to​ ​exempt​ ​all areas​ ​falling​ ​​ ​within​ ​100km​ ​of​ ​the​ ​India-China​ ​border​ ​from​ ​its​ ​purview,​ ​this will​ ​enable​ ​time​ ​bound​ ​land​ ​acquisition​ ​leading​ ​to​ ​inclusive​ ​infrastructure development.​ ​The​ ​PM​ ​Modi​ ​led​ ​government​ ​did​ ​attempt​ ​to​ ​amend​ ​the LARR​ ​2013​ ​soon​ ​after​ ​assuming​ ​power,​ ​but​ ​failed​ ​as​ ​it​ ​did​ ​not​ ​have​ ​the majority​ ​in​ ​Rajya​ ​Sabha.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​near​ ​impossible​ ​to​ ​acquire​ ​land​ ​in​ ​the​ ​border regions​ ​in​ ​an​ ​acceptable​ ​time​ ​frame​ ​even​ ​for​ ​construction​ ​of​ ​defences​ ​in depth.

There​ ​is​ ​also​ ​a​ ​need​ ​to​ ​evolve​ ​an​ ​integrated​ ​infrastructure development​ ​plan​ ​where​ ​in​ ​the​ ​NHAI​ ​is​ ​responsible​ ​for​ ​constructing​ ​the main​ ​arteries,​ ​a​ ​revamped​ ​Border​ ​Road​ ​Organisation​ ​​ ​mandated​ ​to construct​ ​the​ ​feeder​ ​roads​ ​and​ ​the​ ​army​ ​to​ ​ensure​ ​last​ ​mile​ ​connectivity through​ ​its​ ​integral​ ​​ ​resources​ ​of​ ​operational​ ​works.​ ​​ ​​ ​In​ ​addition​ ​to​ ​the​ ​plan the​ ​government​ ​​ ​should​ ​constitute​ ​a​ ​National​ ​Infrastructure​ ​Development Board​ ​​ ​under​ ​the​ ​Niti​ ​Aayog​ ​comprising​ ​of​ ​all​ ​relevant​ ​ministries​ ​including the​ ​representatives​ ​from​ ​the​ ​Army​ ​and​ ​Navy,​ ​fully​ ​empowered​ ​and accountable​ ​to​ ​execute​ ​and​ ​monitor​ ​time​ ​bound​ ​​ ​development.​ ​​ ​The​ ​Border Roads​ ​Organisation​ ​​ ​be​ ​reconstituted​ ​and​ ​reorganized​ ​from​ ​a​ ​work​ ​charge organization​ ​to​ ​a​ ​corporation​ ​on​ ​the​ ​lines​ ​of​ ​Delhi​ ​Metro​ ​Rail​ ​Corporation. Reforms​ ​in​ ​established​ ​systems​ ​and​ ​organizations​ ​which​ ​have​ ​failed​ ​to deliver​ ​is​ ​a​ ​must​ ​to​ ​enable​ ​them​ ​to​ ​perform.

In​ ​July​ ​2013,​ ​the​ ​government​ ​sanctioned​ ​​ ​a​ ​strength​ ​of​ ​over​ ​90,000 troops​ ​at​ ​an​ ​estimated​ ​cost​ ​of​ ​approx​ ​64,600​ ​crores,​ ​​ ​including​ ​the Mountain​ ​Strike​ ​Corps,​ ​as​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​accretion​ ​forces​ ​for​ ​the​ ​Northern Borders.​ ​​ ​Reportedly​ ​the​ ​sanctioned​ ​money​ ​has​ ​not​ ​been​ ​allotted​ ​and​ ​the Army​ ​continues​ ​to​ ​raise​ ​and​ ​equip​ ​the​ ​accretion​ ​forces​ ​from​ ​within​ ​its​ ​own resources.​ ​​ ​This​ ​leads​ ​to​ ​avoidable​ ​voids​ ​and​ ​hollowness,​ ​sharing​ ​poverty only​ ​degrades​ ​the​ ​operational​ ​and​ ​logistics​ ​efficacy​ ​of​ ​other​ ​formations. The​ ​sanctioned​ ​funds​ ​should​ ​be​ ​made​ ​available​ ​immediately​ ​for​ ​early operationalisation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​mountain​ ​strike​ ​corps​ ​and​ ​making​ ​up​ ​of​ ​voids​ ​in the​ ​border​ ​management​ ​posture.

During​ ​the​ ​Doklam​ ​standoff​ ​a​ ​few​ ​domain​ ​experts​ ​compared​ ​the strengths​ ​of​ ​the​ ​forces​ ​and​ ​concluded​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Indian​ ​Air​ ​Force​ ​has​ ​an​ ​edge over​ ​the​ ​PLA​ ​Air​ ​Force​ ​on​ ​account​ ​technology,​ ​terrain​ ​and​ ​training.​ ​The Indian​ ​Navy​ ​too​ ​enjoys​ ​relative​ ​supoeriority​ ​over​ ​the​ ​PLA​ ​Navy​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Indian Ocean​ ​as​ ​also​ ​the​ ​ab​ ​initio​ ​deployment​ ​and​ ​defence​ ​preparedness​ ​of​ ​the Indian​ ​Army​ ​was​ ​strong​ ​enough​ ​to​ ​hold​ ​its​ ​own​ ​ground​ ​and​ ​possibly​ ​teach the​ ​PLA​ ​a​ ​lesson.​ ​​ ​While​ ​these​ ​assessments​ ​may​ ​stand​ ​scrutiny​ ​to​ ​an extent​ ​and​ ​may​ ​not​ ​be​ ​all​ ​rhetoric,​ ​​ ​​ ​but​ ​the​ ​days​ ​of​ ​a​ ​linear​ ​war​ ​alone​ ​are over.​ ​​ ​The​ ​future​ ​wars​ ​​ ​will​ ​be​ ​multi-domain​ ​wars​ ​,​ ​all​ ​elements​ ​duly integrated​ ​to​ ​achieve​ ​​ ​laid​ ​down​ ​military​ ​objectives.​ ​​ ​Linear​ ​wars​ ​are​ ​only​ ​a subset​ ​of​ ​future​ ​multi​ ​domain​ ​warfare.​ ​​ ​Doklam​ ​was​ ​definitely​ ​different​ ​from the​ ​earlier​ ​stand​ ​offs​ ​at​ ​Chumar​ ​(2014)​ ​and​ ​Depsang​ ​(2013),​ ​as​ ​China resorted​ ​to​ ​an​ ​information​ ​war,​ ​exploiting​ ​both​ ​the​ ​Chinese​ ​media​ ​​ ​and​ ​also investing​ ​​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Indian​ ​media.​ ​​ ​Informational​ ​warfare​ ​is​ ​an​ ​​ ​essential element​ ​of​ ​national​ ​power.​ ​​ ​India​ ​on​ ​the​ ​other​ ​hand​ ​ensured​ ​a​ ​very​ ​mature and​ ​steady​ ​stance​ ​ensuring​ ​strategic​ ​communication​ ​without​ ​resorting​ ​to rhetoric.​ ​​ ​However,​ ​India​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Indian​ ​military​ ​in​ ​particular​ ​should​ ​raise​ ​a Director​ ​General​ ​of​ ​Information​ ​Warfare​ ​(DGIW)​ ​functioning​ ​under​ ​the Director​ ​General​ ​Defence​ ​Intelligence​ ​Agency,​ ​to​ ​synergise​ ​and​ ​jointly strategise​ ​and​ ​execute​ ​this​ ​all​ ​important​ ​domain​ ​of​ ​future​ ​wars.​ ​​ ​The​ ​DGIW will​ ​have​ ​three​ ​verticals,​ ​Public​ ​Information​ ​,​ ​Social​ ​Media​ ​​ ​and Psychologies​ ​Operations​ ​.​ ​​ ​This​ ​​ ​organization​ ​is​ ​a​ ​must​ ​in​ ​today’s​ ​changed environment​ ​for​ ​external​ ​and​ ​internal​ ​threats.​ ​The​ ​multi​ ​domain​ ​warfare also​ ​includes​ ​the​ ​all​ ​important​ ​​ ​Cyber,​ ​​ ​Space​ ​and​ ​Special​ ​Operations commands.​ ​​ ​Though​ ​these​ ​were​ ​recommended​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Naresh​ ​Chandra Task​ ​Force​ ​in​ ​2012​ ​and​ ​Chiefs​ ​of​ ​Staff​ ​Committee​ ​in​ ​2013​ ​detailed​ ​the charter​ ​and​ ​structures,​ ​till​ ​date​ ​the​ ​approvals​ ​are​ ​pending.​ ​The​ ​57,000​ ​odd manpower​ ​savings​ ​as​ ​recommended​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Shekatkar​ ​committee​ ​and approved​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Raksha​ ​Mantri​ ​on​ ​30​ ​Aug​ ​​ ​can​ ​be​ ​redeployed​ ​to​ ​raise these​ ​commands.

As​ ​is​ ​well​ ​known​ ​the​ ​PLA​ ​is​ ​in​ ​the​ ​process​ ​of​ ​carrying​ ​out​ ​major reforms,​ ​reorganising​ ​the​ ​erstwhile​ ​military​ ​regions​ ​into​ ​Integrated​ ​Theatre Commands.​ ​​ ​Prime​ ​Minister​ ​Modi​ ​in​ ​his​ ​address​ ​​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Combined Commanders​ ​​ ​in​ ​Dec​ ​2015​ ​onboard​ ​INS​ ​Vikrant​ ​and​ ​again​ ​in​ ​Jan​ ​2017​ ​at Dehradun​ ​has​ ​asked​ ​the​ ​senior​ ​military​ ​leadership​ ​to​ ​challenge​ ​their military​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​evolve​ ​integrated​ ​command​ ​structures​ ​based​ ​on theatres​ ​leading​ ​to​ ​jointmanship​ ​and​ ​optimizing​ ​resources.​ ​To​ ​be​ ​future ready​ ​the​ ​transition​ ​to​ ​integrated​ ​theatre​ ​commands​ ​is​ ​an​ ​imperative.​ ​The Shekatkar​ ​committee​ ​has​ ​made​ ​very​ ​comprehensive​ ​and​ ​all​ ​encompassing recommendations​ ​.​ ​As​ ​of​ ​date​ ​only​ ​65​ ​of​ ​the​ ​188​ ​recommendations​ ​have been​ ​approved​ ​by​ ​the​ ​government,​ ​most​ ​of​ ​the​ ​macro​ ​issues​ ​are​ ​still​ ​under consideration​ ​and​ ​analysis.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​time​ ​the​ ​MoD​ ​under​ ​the​ ​new​ ​Raksha Mantri​ ​approves​ ​and​ ​implements​ ​the​ ​defence​ ​reforms​ ​as​ ​per​ ​Shekatkar committee​ ​and​ ​transforms​ ​the​ ​Indian​ ​military​ ​power​ ​to​ ​a​ ​military​ ​force capable​ ​of​ ​addressing​ ​future​ ​security​ ​challenges​ ​effectively.

The​ ​peace​ ​and​ ​tranquility​ ​along​ ​the​ ​disputed​ ​border​ ​is​ ​a​ ​result​ ​of​ ​five agreements​ ​based​ ​on​ ​the​ ​five​ ​principles​ ​of​ ​Panchsheel.​ ​The​ ​confidence building​ ​measures​ ​between​ ​India​ ​and​ ​China​ ​have​ ​stood​ ​the​ ​test​ ​of​ ​time even​ ​under​ ​severe​ ​stress​ ​like​ ​in​ ​Doklam.​ ​​ ​These​ ​CBMs​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​be consolidated​ ​and​ ​reinforced.​ ​​ ​Additional​ ​Border​ ​Personnel​ ​Meeting​ ​points can​ ​be​ ​established​ ​at​ ​mutually​ ​agreed​ ​places​ ​for​ ​better​ ​understanding​ ​and cordial​ ​relations​ ​among​ ​commanders​ ​and​ ​troop​ ​facing​ ​each​ ​other.​ ​​ ​At​ ​the regional​ ​level​ ​the​ ​troops​ ​could​ ​engage​ ​in​ ​non​ ​contact​ ​games​ ​in​ ​the​ ​border region.​ ​​ ​The​ ​‘Hand​ ​in​ ​Hand’​ ​joint​ ​exercise​ ​between​ ​​ ​the​ ​two​ ​countries​ ​could be​ ​enhanced​ ​taking​ ​it​ ​to​ ​the​ ​next​ ​level.​ ​​ ​Increased​ ​visits​ ​of​ ​Naval​ ​ships​ ​to each​ ​other​ ​ports​ ​and​ ​even​ ​joint​ ​military​ ​drills​ ​whether​ ​bilateral​ ​or​ ​multilateral is​ ​a​ ​good​ ​step​ ​forward.​ ​The​ ​hotline​ ​between​ ​the​ ​Indian​ ​and​ ​Pakistan DGMO​ ​has​ ​been​ ​an​ ​effective​ ​mechanism​ ​for​ ​crisis​ ​management​ ​and exchange​ ​of​ ​information.​ ​​ ​This​ ​should​ ​be​ ​replicated​ ​with​ ​China. China​ ​respects​ ​strength​ ​and​ ​it​ ​is​ ​a​ ​must​ ​for​ ​India​ ​to​ ​not​ ​only demonstrate​ ​strength​ ​but​ ​also​ ​build​ ​capabilities,​ ​enhance​ ​capacities​ ​and improve​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​inadequate​ ​infrastructure.​ ​​ ​​ ​It​ ​is​ ​an​ ​imperative​ ​for​ ​the​ ​two Asian​ ​giants​ ​to​ ​resolve​ ​their​ ​difference​ ​peacefully​ ​and​ ​arrive​ ​at​ ​a​ ​common understanding​ ​of​ ​the​ ​LAC​ ​till​ ​a​ ​resolution​ ​to​ ​the​ ​boundary​ ​question​ ​can​ ​be worked​ ​out.​ ​​ ​Peace​ ​and​ ​tranquility​ ​along​ ​the​ ​LAC​ ​is​ ​a​ ​must​ ​for​ ​both countries​ ​to​ ​ensure​ ​long​ ​term​ ​peace,​ ​stability​ ​and​ ​development.​ ​The​ ​Army is​ ​effective,​ ​however​ ​they​ ​need​ ​infrastructure​ ​development​ ​and​ ​certain structural​ ​changes​ ​to​ ​be​ ​future​ ​ready​ ​to​ ​ensure​ ​continued​ ​peace​ ​and tranquility along​ ​the​ ​LAC

The​ ​Immediate​ ​tasks​ ​for​ ​the​ ​new​ ​Raksha​ ​Mantri​ ​are​ ​cut​ ​out.​ ​China respects​ ​strength​ ​and​ ​the​ ​MoD​ ​has​ ​to​ ​invest​ ​in​ ​capability​ ​building​ ​and capacity​ ​enhancement​ ​to​ ​be​ ​future​ ​ready​ ​and​ ​ensure​ ​continued​ ​equilibrium, peace​ ​and​ ​tranquility​ ​along​ ​the​ ​India​ ​China​ ​border.

Lt​ ​Gen​ ​Vinod​ ​Bhatia​ ​(Retd)
Director​ ​Centre​ ​for​ ​Joint​ ​Warfare​ ​Studies
Former​ ​DGMO​ ​and​ ​Siliguri​ ​based​ ​Corps​ ​Commander